47 years a slave: A new perspective on the occupation
47 years a slave: A new perspective on the occupation
Very few
struggles in history have centered on how a nation should treat a third group
of people, but there are strong parallels between black slavery and Israel’s
treatment of the Palestinians.
Open Haaretz
on any given day. Half or three quarters of its news items will invariably
revolve around the same two topics: people struggling to protect the good name
of Israel, and people struggling against its violence and injustices.
An almost
random example: On December 17, 2013, one could read, on a single Haaretz page,
Chemi
Shalev reporting on the decision of the American Studies Association to boycott
Israeli academic institutions in order to “honor the call of Palestinian civil
society.” In response, former
Harvard University President Lawrence Summers dubbed the decision “anti-Semitic
in effect, if not in intent.”
On the same
page, MK Naftali Bennett
called the bill to prevent outside funding of left-wing NGOs in Israel “too
soft.” The proposed law was meant to protect Israel and Israeli soldiers from
“foreign forces” which, in his view, work against the national interest of
Israel through those left-wing nonprofits (for Bennett and many others in
Israel, to defend human rights is to be left-wing).The Haaretz
editorial, backed by an article by regular columnist Sefi Rachlevsky, referred
to the treatment of illegal immigrants by the Israeli government as shameful,
with Rachlevsky calling the current political regime “radical rightist-racist-capitalist,”
because “it tramples democracy and replaces it with fascism.” The day
after, it was the turn of Alan
Dershowitz to call the American Studies Association vote to boycott Israel
shameful, “for singling out the Jew among nations. Shame on them for applying a
double standard to Jewish universities” (December 18).
This
mudslinging has become a normal spectacle to the bemused eyes of ordinary
Israelis and Jews around the world. But what’s astonishing is that this
mud is being thrown by Jews at Jews. Indeed, the valiant combatants for
the good name of Israel miss an important point: the critiques of Israel in
the United States are increasingly waged by Jews, not anti-Semites. The
initiators and leaders of the Boycott Divestment and Sanctions movement are
such respected academics as Judith
Butler, Jacqueline Rose, Noam Chomsky, Hilary Rose and Larry Gross, all Jews.
If Israel is
indeed singled out among the many nations that have a bad record in human
rights, it is because of the personal sense of shame and embarrassment that a
large number of Jews in the Western world feel toward a state that, by its
policies and ethos, does not represent them anymore. As Peter Beinart has been cogently arguing
for some time now, the Jewish people seems to have split into two distinct
factions: One that is dominated by such imperatives as “Israeli security,” “Jewish identity” and by the
condemnation of “the world’s double standards” and “Arabs’ unreliability”; and a second group of Jews, inside and outside
Israel, for whom human rights, freedom, and the rule of law are as visceral and
fundamental to their identity as membership to Judaism is for the first group. Supreme
irony of history: Israel has splintered the Jewish people around two radically
different moral visions of Jews and humanity.
If we are to
find an appropriate analogy to understand the rift inside the Jewish people,
let us agree that the debate between the two groups is neither ethnic (we
belong to the same ethnic group) nor religious (the Judith Butlers of the world
are not trying to push a new or different religious dogma, although the rift
has a certain, but imperfect, overlap with the religious-secular positions).
Nor is the debate a political or ideological one, as Israel is in fact still a
democracy. Rather, the poignancy, acrimony and intensity of the debate are
about two competing and ultimately incompatible conceptions of morality. This
statement is less trivial than it sounds.
For a long
time, the debate between different factions of Jews was framed as an
ideological, strategic or political one (“when, how and what to negotiate with
Palestinians”). But with time, in the face of the systematic colonization of
the land, the pervasive exclusion of Arabs from the body collective, the
Judaization of Israel, the tone of the debate has changed and been replaced by
a question about the moral nature of Zionism. Moral evaluations – whether we
think people are “good” or “bad,” “just” or “unjust,” “worthy” or “unworthy” –
are more fundamental to judgment than political opinion or aesthetic taste. In
that sense, moral evaluations are far less negotiable than any other form of
evaluation.
I will call
one group the “security as morality” group. For this group, Israel is twice
morally beyond reproach. First, because Jews were the super victim of history
and because of Israel’s inherently vulnerable state amidst a sea of enemies.
The status of victim – whether potential or actual – disculpates Israel from
the crimes of the strong. Second, because its weakness commits it to the
forceful defense of its military security, its land and its identity.
Surveying
history, the “security as morality” group observes that might has regularly
been right, and that Israel is no less entitled to its violent policies than
America or other countries have been to their own. For this group, then, Israel
is exonerated by the fact that it’s at once a victim and doesn’t have a worse
historical record than the strong nations of the world. Israel’s morality
becomes defined by the outrages of its enemies, Nazis or Hamas, and by the
worst deeds of the enlightened nations.
The second
group of Jews derives its positions from universal standards of justice, and
from the observation that Israel is fast moving away from the pluralistic,
multiethnic, pacific democracies of the world. Israel stopped being a valid
source of identification for these Jews not because they are self-hating, but
because many of them have been actively involved, in deed or thought, in the
liberalization of their respective societies – that is, in the extension of
human, economic and social rights to a wider variety of groups.
From the
standpoint of that struggle, successfully waged in most Western countries,
Israel makes an unacceptable demand: it requests from Jews loyalty to its
policies, claims to have a moral and political status superior to that of its
neighbors, yet consistently violates the human rights of Palestinians, Arabs,
and liberal Judaism; uses violence; violates international law; and practices
state-sanctioned discrimination toward non-Jews. For liberal Jews, Israel
bullies like a Goliath, yet persists in wanting to be admired as a David.
Interestingly
enough, there are not many episodes in history where groups have fought over
moral issues. Most struggles in history are usually connected to belief and
dogmas (e.g., religious wars), economic interests (class struggles) or to
political power (nationalist liberation movements). Very few struggles have
been about a moral debate on how a group or nation should treat a third group
of people.
There is,
however, one well-known episode
of history in which a single group divided itself in two sides around the moral
question of how a third group of people should be treated, and this episode was
the American antislavery movement.
In using
this example as a soundboard to think about the moral debate that is dividing
the Jewish people, I do not claim that
slavery and the occupation are equivalent. They differ significantly. But there are
some analogies, in that the Jewish world has become splintered around
two intractable moral claims about the treatment of Palestinians. An analogy
is nothing more than a tool to probe thinking. Suppose someone didn’t know what
a tiger was. If I had to explain what a tiger is, I’d say: “It is like a lion,
only with stripes.” In giving this answer, I remain fully aware that a tiger is
not a lion, but only like a “lion,” and this is because a tiger is closer to a
lion than it is to a fish, a bird or a horse. An analogy helps us imagine
and think about something we do not fully grasp, even when that analogy is an
imperfect one.
The debate
about the occupation is not equivalent to the debate about slavery, but it
bears, here and there, some resemblance to it. And it is for this reason that I
use it as a strategy for thinking.
****
The United
States was established as a British colony in the 17th and 18th centuries.
Slavery was a crucial part of the violent colonization of the American
territory. Great Britain then allowed the slave trade with the Caribbean, the
Americas and Brazil, thus enabling the wide use of slaves in the vast and
powerful plantation system in the South and in cities such as New York. Both the North and South enjoyed the benefits of
labor produced by slaves in houses, farms, land and small workshops. At the
beginning of the 19th century, however, Britain – who had a vast and brutal
Empire – forbade the transatlantic commerce of slaves. This was because
Britain, like much of Europe, was caught in its own contradictions: it became aware that the violent use of other people
went against the value of “progress” and “enlightenment” it
otherwise used to justify its own superiority over world populations.
Arguments
against slavery were advanced in the 18th century, but only in the 19th century
did the argument against slavery gain momentum and become widespread,
especially among city dwellers. Many reasons were offered for the striking
change of attitude, the most obvious being the circulation of enlightenment
ideas about the basic rights of human beings; the emergence of mass circulated
newspapers and novels that depicted stories of suffering and made empathy into
a civilized emotion; the increasing
recognition that distant strangers were human beings equal and similar in
rights. The eminent historian of slavery, David Brion Davis, claims that,
ultimately, it was a moral argument that compelled England to claim the
Transatlantic Commerce of Slaves illegal, and it was a moral argument that gave
rise to what historians have called “humanitarian sensibility” in Britain and
in the United States – that is, a new awareness for the suffering of strangers
and for the sacredness of the human person.
In the
United States, once the American Constitution was written, many started to
question the flagrant contradiction between the ideals it endorsed and the
brutal domination of an entire group of people that slavery represented.
Christians (Quakers and Methodists mostly) joined in this struggle as well,
because some slaves were converted to Christianity – and as Christians, they
had a soul, and if they had a soul, they could not be animals and were by
definition free. (As early as 1772, James Somersett, a black man who had
escaped from his master, was freed by the judge because the slave had been
baptized.)
In the
United States, abolishing slavery proved to be a difficult task, as the
internal slave system was very lucrative (slaves being sold within the American
territory rather than imported) and so much of the plantation economy relied
on slave labor. But the most significant obstacle was the proslavery
ideology that was everywhere: in schoolbooks, political speeches, Church
sermons, laws and fictional literature. As is always the case in history, once
a group of people controls economic, human or territorial resources, it
justifies its domination over a group with an ideology.
What is ideology?
The set of beliefs and stories a
group that dominates another tells to itself in order to make its domination
seem natural, deserved and necessary (for example, if Jews are both
powerful and dangerous, it is easy to justify their persecution; or if Mizrahim
are stupid and uneducated, they naturally deserve to live in the periphery).
When the ideology is pervasive, present in different arenas (school textbooks,
politics, newspapers) and when it is sustained by concrete economic and
political interests, ideology becomes an automatic way of thinking, an irresistible way of explaining
reality and acting – or not acting – in it.
In order to
defend and justify their domination over Africans, the proslavery camp used a
number of arguments and diffused them widely: the first argument was a
hierarchical view of human beings. Whites were unquestioningly superior to
Africans, who were compared to animals, and as animals they were dangerous, to
be domesticated and controlled. It is interesting to note that here, as in
other and subsequent forms of racism, blacks were viewed both as weak
(inferior) and strong (dangerous).
Proslavery
people in Britain and the United States further argued that Africa itself
practiced slavery, and that Britain and America in fact were contributing to
the cultural development of the slaves – because African societies were
unskilled and primitive, they stood to benefit by being exposed to the
“advanced” European civilization. The domination of a people is not only caused by the belief that a people
is inherently inferior and dangerous, but the very act of domination makes
these beliefs seem true: the proof of the racist was in the pudding of the plantation owner.
Proslavers
also argued that the land itself was crucial for the nation and for economic
prosperity. Owners of farms and
plantations viewed the land as something to fight for and cherish, a source of
national pride and moral identity. In England and America, the
proslavery lobby despised industrial and wage capitalism, which they viewed as
creating a society of selfish strangers. They, the plantation owners, defended
a less selfish view of society and the nation. Slaves were a part of the
household and could help maintain a society of large units who cared for each
other.
But perhaps
the strongest element justifying the proslavery outlook was the use of the
Bible. For the many Christian believers who made up the South, control over
human beings was based on, and justified by, the famous Bible passage (Genesis
9:18-27) in which Noah curses Ham (presumably of dark color) and dooms him to
be subjugated by Japheth (presumably of lighter color). This biblical narrative
played a crucial role in justifying slavery because it made God and the holy
scriptures give it a seal of sanctity and inevitability (it was later shown by
Christians themselves that this interpretation had no basis in the actual
biblical text). Any domination of human beings is far more powerful if it uses grand
historical and collective narratives that lend to it an aura of historical
mission.
Slavery
provoked one of the greatest moral wars of modern times and, for a while,
threatened to divide the nascent American nation into two distinct national
entities. The two camps went to war and although the reasons for the war were
not only connected to slavery, both parties saw slavery as the essential moral
cause to oppose or defend.
***
Roman law
defined human beings as either slaves or as free, and history has inherited
this dichotomous division. Because of this legal division, we conventionally
think that slavery has disappeared from the modern world. But slavery has not
disappeared. It is more accurate to think of slavery on a continuum, as one of
the most extreme forms of human domination, characterized by the fact that a
human being is treated as the property of another person, and can be sold and
bought like an object or animal.
But slavery
is not only that. If a person or group creates mechanisms to alienate the
freedom and life of another, that person is not technically speaking a slave,
but s/he is subject to conditions of slavery. If an immigrant worker’s passport has been taken away from
them by their employers and made to work 12 hours a day without legal rights
and protection, they live in conditions of slavery. If women
are trafficked for sex purposes and held in conditions of quasi-captivity by
their pimps, they live in conditions of slavery. Slavery, then, is not only the
fact of being turned into a tradable property. It is a set of social
conditions that make someone’s existence closely determined by someone else’s
decision, will and power.
Harvard
sociologist Orlando Patterson, a specialist in the history and sociology of
slavery, defines slavery thus: “The permanent, violent and personal domination of
natally alienated and generally dishonored persons” (quoted in
Brion Davis' "Inhuman Bondage: The Rise and Fall of Slavery in the New
World"). Note that this definition does not assume that a slave is
necessarily a tradable property. Rather, as Patterson defines it, a slave is
someone who is born in a condition in which his life at birth is dependent on
the will of a master; it is someone who is born in a condition of dishonor.
From this definition, we can describe a condition of slavery as having a
number of characteristics.
Slavery is a
state where one does not have access to citizenship. In that
sense, slaves are by definition deprived of the security that membership to a
sovereign political community provides. It also means that they don’t develop
the skills that come with the exercise of rights and duties toward a political
community. This is what Patterson means when he speaks of general “dishonor”: a slave is
deprived of the possibility of being recognized by a sovereign cultural or
political community.
Another
characteristic follows: a slave is submitted to a different legal system than
the one by which the ordinary, free population is regulated (in many cases in
the American South, the law was changed so as to be applied specifically to
African-Americans). Hence, in a slave society, the law is naturally made to fit
the needs of the ruling group, to exonerate them when needed, and to be
especially harsh on the slaves.
Third, slaves are
used to maintain and extend the property of a master but are denied the right
to acquire or extend their own property, through various legal and forceful
means. The capacity of slaves to own or increase land and property is very
limited or nonexistent.
A fourth
characteristic is that slaves are the object of arbitrary physical punishment,
and their life and death are often the master’s decision. Slaves live in fear,
because they know that they can be physically punished, beaten, lashed, killed
at any time.
Fifth, slaves have
very limited social space to move in and out of. In the 19th century, seeing an
unknown African-American somewhere was enough to raise suspicion that he had
run away. Sixth, the personal life – sexuality and marriage – of
slaves is controlled by the master – such as the fact that slaves could marry
only with the permission of the master (in the Roman world, masters had almost
unlimited rights to rape slaves).
***
Ideology is made of stories and powerful metaphors that define
how we perceive and understand reality. Thus, when Israelis cast their
relationship to Palestinians as a purely military one, the label of “military
conflict” has a number of logical, moral and political consequences.
Palestinians are “soldiers,” not civilians; they are enemies to be subdued, not
ordinary civilians; they threaten Israelis, are not helpless; they must be
subjugated by force, in a zero-sum game – if one loses, the other wins.
But the
military metaphor with which Israelis have made sense of their relationship to
Palestinians hides a disturbing fact: what started as a national and
military conflict has morphed into a form of domination of Palestinians
that now increasingly borders on conditions of slavery. If we understand
slavery as a condition of existence and not as ownership and trade of human
bodies, the domination that Israel has exercised over Palestinians turns out
to have created the matrix of domination that I call a “condition of slavery.”
The
Palestinian Prisoner Affairs Ministry has documented that between 1967 and
2012, Israeli authorities arrested some 800,000 Palestinians by power of the
“military code.” (A more conservative assessment from Israeli sources
documented that 700,000 Palestinians were detained between 1967 and 2008.)
This number is astounding, especially in light of the fact that this represents
as much as 40 percent of the entire male population. When a large part of the
adult male population is arrested, it means that the lives of a large number of
breadwinners, the heads of a family, are disrupted, alienated and made into the
object of the arbitrary power of the army. In fact, which nation would create a
Prisoner Affairs Ministry if imprisonment was not such a basic aspect of its
life?
These facts
also mean that a significant portion of the non-incarcerated population lives
under the constant fear and threat of imprisonment. The Israeli
NGO Public Committee against Torture in Israel (PCATI) has established that,
once arrested, hundreds are categorized as “ticking bombs” or “serious
threats.” Once labeled as such, they are treated with a violence prohibited by
international law: prisoners are bound to their chairs in painful positions for
hours, held in isolation, beaten, shaken, prevented from sleeping, verbally
abused, cursed and psychologically humiliated.
The violence
exercised by the military does not stop there. During Operation Cast Lead in
2008-09, the IDF used Gazan civilians as “human shields,” a practice prohibited
by Israeli and international law and conventionally viewed as barbarian. Using
others as human shields consists of taking civilians as hostages, using them
for Israeli military purposes, threatening their families with injury if they
don’t cooperate with the Israel Defense Forces’ attempt to obtain information.
Palestinian boys, from age 13-17, are frequently
arrested by the IDF. Military Court Watch, an Israeli NGO, has found that 50
percent of these children are arrested in night raids, and that 80
percent are blindfolded. In a widely publicized news story, PCATI found
that children are also the object of treatment that is equivalent to torture,
and that the IDF engages in such practices as putting Palestinian children
guilty of minor crimes in cages (for two days), exposed to the cold in the deep
of winter.
To the
military violence, we must add the fact that Palestinians are regularly exposed
to acts of violence by civilians. The settlers known as “hilltop youth” and
“price tag” attacks aim to hurt Palestinians in various ways, in their lands,
property or body. These acts are only sporadically prosecuted by Israel, and
when they are, more often than not it ends with no conviction.
Indeed,
Palestinians are subject to a legal system that is different from the one in
Israel. As the Calcalist
blogger Yossi Gurvitz writes: “[R]esidents of one street in Hebron are judged
according to one legal system, and residents [of a] nearby street under a
different legal system. If a Palestinian child is suspected of throwing stones
at soldiers, IDF gunmen break into his home at night, take him, blindfolded, to
interrogation, accompanied by torture at times, and he will be put in custody.
If a settler is suspected of throwing a stone at a soldier, it is likely nothing
will happen to him. Naturally, no one would think of breaking into his house
during the night.”
Another
example of the stringency of the laws existing in the territories is that
there’s no possibility for a Palestinian to get a verdict of
"non-conviction" in relation to petty crime. Or a Haaretz editorial
titled “An apartheid
legal system just got worse,” which
addresses the new military order issued by the GOC Central Command, Maj. Gen.
Nitzan Alon, prohibiting Palestinians from appealing military court decisions
to confiscate their property. As the article argues, the order “embodies
the essence of the story of the occupation and demonstrates the different law
applied to Israelis and Palestinians in the occupied territories. This order
violates the rights of the Palestinians, and allows arbitrary damage to them,
contrary to international law and the laws of basic justice. The military can
make decisions of this nature – contrary to justice – due to the existence of
two different legal systems in a given geographical area: one for Jews and one
for Arabs.”
These facts
mean, de facto, that Palestinians live not only with a legal system different
from the one used in Israel, but without serious legal protection as well.
Moreover, since the 1990s,
Israel has imposed severe restrictions on Palestinian movement in the West
Bank. During the second intifada, Israel placed dozens of checkpoints in the
West Bank that impede the movement of Palestinians within the area itself. To the
Israeli, this seems only a problem of wasted hours, but the hindrance of
movement touches on the very essence of freedom. It creates a wide-reaching
feeling of imprisonment. (As prime minister, Ariel Sharon cut Gaza City from
Ramallah, for no other reason, probably, than to create such constraints on
movement.)
This feeling
of spatial imprisonment is accompanied by economic strangulation. An essential
part of Israeli domination is achieved by making Palestinian livelihoods depend
on Israel, and monitoring permits of entry to Israel. By making entry to work
in Israel conditional upon good behavior, Israeli powers create fear and
extreme psychological dependency. Moreover, because Israel restricts
Palestinians’ capacity to build new industries, they force them to work in the
very settlements that take their own land, thus increasing their sense of
humiliation and expropriation.
As for the
capacity to own property, Israel has long practiced land expropriation, and
made it impossible for Palestinians to extend their property. The NGO
Israeli Committee Against House Demolitions (ICAHD) established that, in 2013
alone, 634 Palestinian buildings were demolished, 1,033 people displaced and
3,688 injured by the IDF. From these figures, it can be inferred that a basic condition of
life – to have a shelter and home – has been systematically and widely
undermined by the policy of house demolition.
Finally, when it
comes to marriage, here, too, the occupation has torn families apart. According to a
report by B’Tselem – the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the
Occupied Territories, Israeli restrictions on the passage from and to Gaza
Strip split families and force on couples – where one of them is from Gaza, and
the other the West Bank or Israel – a series of bureaucratic restrictions, with
no possibility of conducting a reasonable routine. The simplest thing – raising a
family, living with spouse and children, and maintaining contact with families
of origin of both partners – become unachievable.
In traditional Palestinian society, the custom is that
the women will move in with the husband's family, so the procedures established
by the Israeli offensive affect mainly women: Married Gazans living in the West
Bank are forced to leave their family and familiar surroundings, without any
possibility to visit the Gaza Strip, except for the most exceptional cases.
Those who failed to update their address are in constant danger of expulsion
from their homes.
We can say conservatively and impressionistically
that 70 percent of the Palestinian population live with a permanent sense of
dishonor, conduct their lives without predictability and continuity, live in
fear of Jewish terror and of the violence of the Israeli military power, and
are afraid to have no work, shelter or family. When we put these numbers
under a single coherent picture and ask sociologically what kind of life this
is, we are compelled to observe that a large quantity of Palestinians live
in conditions in which their freedom, honor, physical integrity, capacity to
work, acquire property, marry and, more generally, plan for the future are
alienated to the will and power of their Israeli masters. These conditions
can only be named by their proper name: conditions of slavery.
It should be clear, however, that the occupation is a
condition of slavery, but not slavery: a striped lion is like a tiger,
but isn’t a tiger. The occupation started as a military conflict and,
unbeknown to itself, became a generalized condition of domination, dehumanizing
Palestinians, and ultimately dehumanizing Israelis themselves. This magnificent
people – which distinguished itself historically by its love of God, its love
of texts and its love of morality – has become the manager of a vast enterprise
of brutal military domination.
***
Without ever
intending to, Israelis have become the Lords and Masters of a people, and the
only interesting question about this is not how we got there (domination has
its own internal incremental and implacable dynamic), but why so many Jews
outside and inside of Israel are not more disturbed by this.
The reason
for this is that Israel has its own proslavery lobby, which is now in the corridors
of power, shapes Israel’s policy and has successfully managed to make the
occupation appear to be a containable casualty of war and nation-building. The
settlers’ discourse – which only 20 years ago was marginal in Israeli society
–has become mainstream, and one can only be struck by its resemblance to the
19th-century American proslavery ideology.
***
The idea
that Jews are inherently superior to Arabs is so widespread, deep and
unquestioned, that it is hardly worth my time dwelling on it here. The idea
of Jewish superiority exists everywhere in Israel, but is most blatant in the
territories. Like the whites in the American South, Jews view themselves as
obviously more moral, superior, civilized, technologically and economically far
more accomplished than the inferior Arabs (Arab nations are indeed politically
and economically backward, but this in no way makes Arabs inferior). In the
same way that it was entirely obvious to proslavers that Africans were
primitive and animal-like, Arabs
are viewed as unreliable, liars, stupid and dangerous. These
views dictate official policy. And in the same way that the whites in the South
claimed to be civilizing the primitive Africans, one can frequently hear that Arabs have benefited from
the technological and political enlightenment of Israel.
An example of Jewish
supremacy can be seen in the book “The King’s Torah” (“Torat Hamelech”),
written by the head rabbi of Yeshivat Od Yosef Chai (which was located in
Nablus and then moved to the Yitzhar settlement). According to the book, Jews are superior to non-Jews, with
Gentiles being close to animals because they did not accept the Seven Laws of
Noah. In an amended world, killing a non-Jew who does not accept the
commandments of Noah will become necessary. The book also suggests that because
Jews are now at war, it is permissible – based on traditional sources – to kill
Gentiles, including children, because of the fear that they will grow and
become dangerous adults. In a review of the book, the highly respected
historian Yehuda Bauer suggests that the book is not a marginal phenomenon of a
handful of extremists. According to him, the book was endorsed by famous rabbis, such as Rabbi Yitzhak Ginsburg
(the former head of Yeshivat Od Yosef Chai) and the well-known Hebron Rabbi Dov
Lior. Yeshivas teach this book or at least contents that are very
similar to it, and Yeshiva students are recruited into the IDF in increasing
numbers. Some of these young people become an important nucleus of hilltop
youth and price-tag launchers who reject the laws of the state, illegally take
possession of the land, and attack Palestinians. Even the Hebrew University
Hillel hosted an official event to discuss the book with its author, thus
putting it on a par with academic books.
Prof. Bauer
concludes that the book should be taken seriously because it indicates the
direction of a growing part of the settlers’ movement. One hopes that the price
tag attacks, which have grown at a staggering rate in the last few years, create an atmosphere of (Jewish) terror among
Palestinians and have remained unpunished by the state, do not end
up resembling the Ku Klux Klan in the American South.
Like their
19th-century counterparts, the settlers hold in contempt the “individualism”
and “egoism” of the city dwellers of Tel Aviv, the city most likely to oppose
the occupation – much like the white farmers held in contempt the abolitionists
of America’s urban east coast. They view the “state” of Tel Aviv as a place in
which raw economic forces and crass materialism destroy the idealism of the
land.
Israel Harel, the first
chairman of the Yesha Council of settlements, claimed in a Haaretz article that
the environment in Tel Aviv projects an atmosphere that encourages evading
military service, and that Tel Aviv conveys a degree of detachment from
Israel’s survival needs. In his book on the settlement movement (“The Settlers and
the Struggle over the Meaning of Zionism”), Gadi Taub quotes Harel as
saying that the Israelis have lost their identity and spine, and are a
metastasis of the West. Using fears of decadence familiar to the European
right, Harel claims that the West has observed a steady
deterioration in values, materialism and Nihilism.
Finally, and
most strikingly, exactly like their southern 19th-century counterparts the
settlers have abundantly sanctified the land through Bible narratives and see
themselves, like the proslavery owners, as executing God’s will. Rabbi Zvi
Yehuda Kook, the son of Rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook, claimed that the
“Lord of the universe has its own politics, according to which the politics of
Earth is managed ... part of this redemption is the conquest of the land and
settlement in it. No earthly politics can stand against this assertion of divine politics.” Hanan Porat, one of the
leaders of the settlement movement, argued that the “commandment to settle the
land increases the lifetime value of the individual.” The Bible has been used
both as a way to sanctify the land and justify its conquest.
Given what
precedes them, the positions of MKs such as Miri Regev, Yariv Levin, Danny
Danon and Naftali Bennett seem to be a “vanilla” version of the worldview
defended by settlers. If indeed the settlers and their representatives in the
Knesset have “mainstreamed” views that are strangely reminiscent of those of
slave owners, then this only begs further the question of why so many are
unable or unwilling to grasp this.
I will
venture one explanation. Jews around the world view themselves as a minority in
need of protection. Israel itself, because of its inherent connection to the
Jewish people, has kept alive the memory of persecutions. Jews around the world
live their identity as a weak one, as belonging to a minority, as bound to a
history of perennial struggle against Amalek. Such vision is bound to project
its own existential anxieties and sense of vulnerability, even on a military
superpower such as Israel and to view its justification of military violence as
a simple strategy of (ancestral) survival.
Undoubtedly,
there are major differences between Palestinians and black slaves: Some
Palestinians are virulently anti-Semitic and are supported by even more violent
anti-Semites in the surrounding Arab countries; Palestinians have their own
police force; from time to time, they send suicide bombers or launch missiles
on Israel.
But my point
is precisely the following: The occupation is like a photomontage that
superposes two different pictures of two different realities. I ask my reader
to see two images at once: the occupation as a humanitarian disaster,
superposed on the occupation as a military conflict. More than that, the
enslavement of the life condition of Palestinians has prevented the possibility
of making this conflict into a military one. Israel, the most
security-conscious state on the planet, has failed to make its conflict with
the Palestinians into a military one. Instead, it has been dragged into a
humanitarian disaster that has provoked a moral war and unbridgeable rift
within the Jewish people. The public relations strategies of the state will not
silence this moral war.
***
Conclusion
What does it mean for a country to have created such conditions of slavery for a people, and yet fail to register it? The question here is not only about the (im)morality of the occupation, but, more fundamentally, about the increasing difficulty of articulating a moral language to grasp the very nature of the occupation – initially the result of a military conflict and now a humanitarian disaster. If 19th-century slavery was known as slavery to all involved, the occupation has not produced its own adequate moral label.
Conclusion
What does it mean for a country to have created such conditions of slavery for a people, and yet fail to register it? The question here is not only about the (im)morality of the occupation, but, more fundamentally, about the increasing difficulty of articulating a moral language to grasp the very nature of the occupation – initially the result of a military conflict and now a humanitarian disaster. If 19th-century slavery was known as slavery to all involved, the occupation has not produced its own adequate moral label.
We do not
know what the occupation is, and we
do not know what it is because language itself has been colonized. By
defining it in military terms, Israelis fail
to see what the world sees. Israelis see terrorists and enemies, and the world sees weak, dispossessed
and persecuted people. The world reacts with moral outrage at Israel’s continued
domination of Palestinians, and Israel ridicules such moral outrage as an
expression of double standards. The world sees Israeli tanks and
military technology against Palestinian, homeless people, but Israel sees these
denunciations as self-hatred or anti-Semitism. The world wants a just
solution, and Israel sees the demand for justice as a threat to its existence.
In that
sense, the debate dividing the Jewish people is more difficult than the debate
about slavery, because there is no agreement even on how to properly name the
vast enterprise of domination that has been created in the territories. If
Britain at the beginning of the 19th century understood that it couldn’t keep
claiming that it represented the enlightened values of freedom and humanity and
engage in the barbaric commerce of slaves, Israel is more embarrassed, for in a
way it doesn’t know that it’s engaged in an enterprise it cannot justify.
Israel is
dangerously sailing away from the moral vocabulary of most countries of the
civilized world. The fact that many readers will think that my sources are unreliable
because they come from organizations that defend human rights proves this
point. Israel no longer speaks the ordinary moral language of enlightened
nations. But in refusing to speak that language, it is de facto dooming
itself to isolation. Israel will not indefinitely have the cake of “democracy” and
eat it in the occupation.
ضد يهودية وديمقراطية
أسرة التحرير
هآرتس 7/2/2014
قبل نحو 20 سنة عُرفت اسرائيل بالقانون
كـ دولة يهودية وديمقراطية، تعريف يعكس تجسيد الخطة الصهيونية لاقامة وطن سياسي لليهود
في اطار ديمقراطي يمنح مساواة الحقوق لكل المواطنين، بمن فيهم من ليسوا يهودا. لا خلاف
على أن هذا تعريف ناجح. فهو يشكل اساسا متينا لتطور الدولة وانخراط المواطنين غير اليهود
فيها الهدف الذي اعتبرته حكومات اسرائيل حيويا. كما أن هذا التعريف مقبول من اصدقاء
اسرائيل في العالم، لانه يعكس قيمتين اساسيتين هامتين لهم. غير أنه في السنوات الاخيرة
تجري حملة عنيفة لتغيير تعريف اسرائيل بشكل يعزز الجانب اليهودي الذي فيها ويخضع اليه
الجانب الديمقراطي. وهكذا جاءت الى العالم مبادرات تشريع مختلفة تحقق بعضها مثل قانون
لجان القبول، وبعضها قيد البحث، مثل القانون الاساس: الدولة القومية للشعب اليهودي،
والذي تبلور البروفيسورة روت غبيزون بشأنه ورقة موقف تنقل الى وزيرة العدل.
لشدة الاسف فان رئيس الوزراء
ايضا، غير المعروف كصاحب مواقف غير ديمقراطية، قفز الى هذه العربة لمطالبته الفلسطينيين
ان يعترفوا باسرائيل كالدولة القومية للشعب اليهودي.
في اطار الحملة لتصفية تعريف يهودية وديمقراطية
ستبحث اللجنة الوزارية للتشريع يوم الاحد في مشروع قانون يوجه المدارس لتعزيز الفهم
الذي يرى في اسرائيل دولة القومية اليهودية. وحالة ادام فرتا بالذات تجسد بان المطلوب
هو تعليم لتعزيز اسرائيل كدولة يهودية وديمقراطية ولا يجب النظر الى مشروع القانون
الا كدحر الجانب الديمقراطي في تعريف اسرائيل. المشروع يبرر في انه توجد محاولة للمس
بالعلاقة الخاصة التي لشعب اسرائيل في بلاده، بالخصوصية، بالانتماء وبالصلة التي لشعب
اسرائيل بدولة اسرائيل. واضح أنه لم تجري في أي مكان مثل هذه المحاولة. الموجود هو
محاولة مقترحي القانون لتآكل الجانب الديمقراطي في تعريف اسرائيل.
هذا سبب كاف لان ترفض اللجنة الوزارية المشروع
والذي بشكل أوسع ينبغي النظر اليه ايضا كجزء من حملة ضم المناطق
المحتلة في ظل المس بحقوق سكانها.
تعليقات